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Abstract. Owing to resource constraints, the existing prioritization and
selection techniques for software security requirements (countermeasures)
find a subset of higher-priority security requirements ignoring lower-
priority requirements or postponing them to the future releases. Ignor-
ing or postponing security requirements however, may on one hand leave
some of the security threats (vulnerabilities) unattended and on the other
hand influence other security requirements that rely on the ignored or
postponed requirements. To address this, we have proposed considering
partial satisfaction of security requirements when tolerated rather than
ignoring those requirements or postponing them to the future. In doing
so, we have contributed a goal-based framework that enables prioritiza-
tion and partial selection of security requirements with respect to secu-
rity goals. The proposed framework helps reduce the number of ignored
(postponed) security requirements and consequently reduce the adverse
impacts of ignoring security requirements in software products.
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1 Introduction
Security requirements (countermeasures) are to enhance security of software
products. Nonetheless, due to the resources limitations it is hardly if ever pos-
sible to implement the entire set of identified security requirements for a soft-
ware system [16]. Consequently, an efficient prioritization and selection tech-
nique is required to find an optimal subset of security requirements for soft-
ware products[29,31]. However, due to the following problems existing Prior-
itization And Selection (PAS) techniques [13,4,35,9,8,10,20] have failed to be
widely adopted by software practitioners [6,7]. The first problem i.e. Complexity
is that most of the existing PAS techniques are impractical to large number of
requirements [29,6,3]. Adopted in prioritization of security requirements [11,19],
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) has been the most promising [11] prioriti-
zation and selection technique [6] for years. However AHP suffers from high
number of required comparisons [11]. Industrial studies have demonstrated that
using AHP is not practical for more than 20 requirements [14].There have been
few reported techniques [6,3] to reduce the complexity of prioritization process
but they have sacrificed the precision and consistency of the process [6].
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2The second problem is Imprecision of PAS techniques [6] resulted by neglect-
ing partiality of security and assuming that a security requirement can either be
fully satisfied or ignored. But, ignoring (postponing) security requirements even
if they are of lower priorities may leave some of security threats unattended and
eventually result in security breaches in software systems. Moreover, ignoring a
security requirement may also negatively influence the efficiency of other secu-
rity requirements which rely on that requirement. As such, ignoring a security
requirement may potentially cause cascading security vulnerabilities in software
systems.
To address the complexity and imprecision problems, we have proposed car-
ing for partiality of security in a prioritization and selection process. In doing
so, we have contributed a goal-based framework referred to as the Prioritization
And Partial Selection (PAPS) which enhances precision of a prioritization and
selection process by allowing for partial selection (satisfaction) [28] of security
requirements when tolerated rather than ignoring those requirements altogether
or postponing them to the future releases. The proposed framework helps reduce
the number of ignored or postponed security requirements which will ultimately
reduce the number of unattended security threats and mitigate the adverse im-
pact of ignoring (postponing) security requirements. The PAPS framework is
scalable to large number of requirements and allows for prioritization and selec-
tion of security requirements with respect to security goals.
The proposed PAPS framework is composed of two major processes as demon-
strated in Figure 1. The first process referred to as Pre Prioritization and Se-
lection (Pre-PAS) includes modeling, description, and analysis of security re-
quirements. The Pre-PAS process uses our previously developed security model
known as Security Requirement Model (SRM) [21] to capture partiality of secu-
rity requirements (goals) [16]. The second process referred to as Prioritization
and Selection (PAS) process on the other hand, takes the formally described
SRM of a software and its corresponding analysis results as the input and con-
structs the Security Requirement List (SRL) of that software. Then security
requirements in SRL will be prioritized using a Fuzzy Inference System (FIS)
[12]. Each security requirement in SRL contributes to satisfaction of at least
one security goal. The FIS, infers linguistic priority values of the security re-
quirements with respect to their impact, cost and technical-ability. We care for
partiality in the optimal SRL through RELAX-ing [34] satisfaction conditions
of security requirements when partial satisfaction of those requirements is toler-
ated. Security requirements then will be RELAX-ed and included in the optimal
SRL of software based on their fuzzy membership values.
The paper continues with an overview of our employed modeling and descrip-
tion technique (Section 3). Then we introduce the PAPS framework (Section
3.1) and verify its validity through applying it to an Online Banking System
(OBS) [21]. The paper will be concluded in Section 4 with a summary of the
work and some general remarks.
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Fig. 1: Architecture of the Proposed PAPS Framework
2 Pre-PAS Process
The Pre-PAS process as depicted in Figure 1, includes modeling, description and
analysis of security requirements.
2.1 Modeling and Description of Security Requirements
Security Requirement Model (SRM) of a software is constructed by a goal-based
modeling process presented in our earlier work[21]. The process starts with iden-
tification of the assets [18,27] for a software product. Then, security goals will
be developed to protect the assets against attack scenarios [30]. Throughout
the subsequent steps a security requirement model (SRM) of software will be
constructed to mitigate security faults. Our goal-based modeling process made
use of a combination of RELAX [34] and KAOS [33] description languages to
describe security goals (requirements). The security requirement model of the
OBS is illustrated in Figure 2 and SRM nodes are described in Table 1. We have
further, made use of a fuzzy-based technique presented in our earlier work [22]
to formally describe partiality in security requirement model of a software. In
the following we have briefly described the main components of the employed
fuzzy-based technique.
4Table 1: KAOS Description for Security Requirements (Goals) of the OBS.
Goal Description Requirement Description
S maintain OBS security R1 achieve request transaction code
G1 avoid transfer money out of account R2 achieve latency examination
G2 avoid unauthorized online transfer R3 achieve one-time pad
G3 avoid stealing id and password R4 achieve SSL
G4 avoid man in the middle R5 achieve password trial limitation
G5 avoid guessing id and password R6 achieve password policy
G6 avoid dictionary attack R7 achieve password encryption
G7 avoid guess password R8 achieve random id
G8 avoid guess id R9 achieve CAPTCHA
G9 avoid brute forcing R10 achieve complex pin
G10 avoid unauthorized transfer via debit card R11 achieve access control
G11 maintain transfer network security R12 achieve redundant server
G12 avoid hijack server
G13 maintain service availability
Fig. 2: SRM of the OBS
i.Goal-Based Fuzzy Grammar (GFG). A GFG is defined as a quintuple of
GR = (G,R, P, S, µ) in which G is a set of security goals, R is a set of security
requirements, P is a set of fuzzy derivation rules and µ denotes the membership
function of derivation. S represents the top-level security goal of the system. For
OBS, G = {G1, ..., G13}, R = {R1, ..., R12}, P = {P1, ..., P20} and S=“maintain
[OBS] [security]”. Due to its fuzziness, GFG can properly capture partiality in
SRM of a software.
5Table 2: Derivation rules for SRM of the OBS.
Rule Membership Value Rule Membership Value
P1 : S → G1G13 0.95 P11 : G4 → R2R3 0.75
P2 : G1 → G2G10G12 0.95 P12 : G4 → R4 0.9
P3 : G13 → R12 0.9 P13 : G6 → G7 0.6
P4 : G2 → R1G3G5 0.85 P14 : G6 → G8 0.6
P5 : G10 → G11 0.9 P15 : G9→ G7 0.65
P6 : G10 → R10 0.4 P16 : G9 → G8 0.6
P7 : G12 → R11 0.9 P17 : G7 → R5 0.7
P8 : G3 → G4 0.85 P18 : G7 → R6 0.8
P9 : G5 → G6G9 0.9 P19 : G7 → R7 0.9
P10 : G11 → R9 0.8 P20 : G8 → R8 0.6
Table 3: Cost and Technical-ability of the OBS Security Requirements.
Requirement R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12
Cost 0.50 0.70 0.70 0.30 0.05 0.50 0.20 0.01 0.60 0.10 0.70 1.00
Technical-ability 1.00 0.20 0.10 0.90 1.00 0.30 0.20 1.00 0.10 1.00 0.20 0.20
The elements of P ∈ GR are expression of form given in 1 where ‘d’ is the
degree of contribution of a sub-goal ‘w’ to satisfaction of a goal ‘r’. If r1, ..., rn
are fuzzy statements in (G∪R)∗ and r1 → r2 → ...→ rn, then we call this chain
as goal derivation chain under the employed GFG.
µ(r → w) = d, d ∈ [0, 1] or µ(r, w) = d (1)
ii. Extracting Derivation Rules. The employed description technique, con-
structs a GFG for a given SRM and identifies the derivation rules [24,22,23].
The degree to which the successive of a rule contributes to satisfaction of its
predecessor, will specify its membership value. This value will be determined by
the membership function of GFG [22]. The extracted derivation rules for SRM
of the OBS, and their corresponding membership values are listed in Table 2.
2.2 Risk Analysis
During the risk analysis, the cost and technical-ability of security requirements
will be identified.
Cost of Implementation. Owing to budget limitations we need to care for
cost of implementation while selecting and prioritizing security requirements
[10]. Table 3 has listed the cost and values for security requirements in the SRM
of the OBS. Cost of implementation is a real number in [1, 100] [26,25].
Technical-Ability. Technical-ability is a real number in [0, 1] which reflects
the ease of implementation for each requirement. Technical-ability of security
requirements of the OBS are computed based on (2) and listed in Table 3.
Technical-Ability =
1
Technical Complexity of Requirement
(2)
6Table 4: Impact of Security Requirements in the SRM of the OBS.
Goal µ(R1) µ(R2) µ(R3) µ(R4) µ(R5) µ(R6) µ(R7) µ(R8) µ(R9) µ(R10) µ(R11) µ(R12)
S 0.85 0.75 0.75 0.85 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.60 0.80 0.40 0.90 0.90
G1 0.85 0.75 0.75 0.85 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.60 0.80 0.40 0.90 0.00
G2 0.85 0.75 0.75 0.85 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
G3 0.00 0.75 0.75 0.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
G4 0.00 0.75 0.75 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
G5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
G6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
G7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.80 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
G8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
G9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
G10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.40 0.00 0.00
G11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00
G12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.00
G13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.90
3 Prioritization and Selection Process
The PAS process starts with preprocessing FIS inputs. Preprocessing includes
construction of SRL and calculation of impacts for security requirements in the
SRL. Subsequently, impacts, costs and technical-abilities will be fuzzified [2] to
serve as the inputs of the FIS. A Mamdani-type [17] fuzzy inference system
then specifies the priorities of security requirements. Prioritization can be per-
formed with special focus on satisfaction of a security goal. Finally, prioritized
requirements will be partially selected (when tolerated) through RELAX-ation
of their satisfaction conditions. To perform RELAX-ation, we need to obtain
Required Degree of Satisfaction (RDS) for each security requirement through
deffuzification of priority values.
3.1 Data Preprocessing
Data preprocessing includes construction of SRL and calculation of impact val-
ues. Let GR = (G,R, P, S, µ) be the GFG of a SRM. For each security goal
g ∈ G, SRL[g] contains security requirements which contribute to satisfaction
of goal g. SRL[g] is constructed for every goal g in SRM of the system. This
allows for goal-oriented prioritization of security requirements with special focus
on satisfaction of individual security goals. For each security requirement x in
SRL[g] the degree to which x contributes to satisfaction of the goal g is referred
to as the impact of x on g and computed by taking maximum (⊕) over mem-
bership degree of all derivations paths that can derive x from g. Membership of
each path is computed by taking minimum (⊗) over membership degrees of all
derivations rules on the path. Impacts for security requirements of the OBS are
listed in Table 4.
DCg(x) = µg(x) = ⊕(µ(g, r1)⊗ µ(r1, r2)⊗ ...⊗ µ(rn, x)) (3)
73.2 Prioritization
Prioritization starts with fuzzification of FIS inputs (impact, cost, and technical-
ability of security requirements). As depicted in Figure 1, the fuzzified values
will serve as the inputs for the FIS. FIS then infers the fuzzied priority values of
requirements based on fuzzy-rule-base of the PAPS framework. Priority of each
requirement specifies the required satisfaction level of that requirement.
3.3 Fuzzification
FIS inputs (impact, cost and technical-ability) are categorized under three fuzzy
categories: Low (L), Medium (M) and High (H). Consequently, three membership
functions are defined for each input and its corresponding categories. We use a
semi-trapezoids shape for membership functions (Figure 4). Hence, four diverse
points are required to define each membership function as given by (4)-(6). We
have use a combination of Fuzzy Control Language (FCL) and jFuzzyLogic [15]
to implement the membership functions.
µiv(x) = max(min(
x− x0
x1 − x0 , 1,
x3 − x
x3 − x2 ), 0) (4)
µ(x0) = µ(x3) = 0, µ(x1) = µ(x2) = 1 (5)
i ∈ {impact, cost, technical-ability}, v ∈ {low,medium, high} (6)
Fig. 3: Fuzzy Rules Implemented in FCL
83.4 Fuzzy Inference
Priorities of security requirements are inferred by a Mamdani-Type [17] FIS using
the fuzzy rule-base of Figure 3. In this regard, linguistic priorities Optional (O),
Weak (W), Normal (N), or Strong (S) will be assigned to security requirements.
Fuzzy rules of course can be tailored to the organizational and technical concerns
of stakeholders. Priorities of the OBS security requirements are listed in Table 5.
Each security requirement in Table 5 is assigned 14 priority values each of which
computed with regard to a specific security goal to assist goal-based prioritization
and selection of requirements. Goal-based PAS provides structured arguments to
the stakeholders. For instance, requirement “R7” in SRL of the OBS is strongly
(weakly) required for satisfaction of the goal “G2” (“G6”).
Fig. 4: Fuzzy Inference for R7 with respect to top-level security goal S
3.5 Partial Selection
It is happening quite often in software systems that a security requirement cannot
be either fully implemented or ignored. In such cases, security requirements
may be tolerated [34,5] to be partially satisfied (selected). Partial satisfaction
of a security requirement can be explicitly addressed through RELAX-ing [5]
its satisfaction condition (level of satisfaction). For instance, implementation of
a complex password policy in a software system increases the level of security
on one hand and reduces the usability of the system [1] on the other hand.
Alternatively, implementing a less complex password policy may be tolerated to
maintain usability of the system. In this case, the requirement will be partially
selected through RELAX-ing its satisfaction condition.
9Table 5: RDS (Linguistic Priority) of the Security Requirements of the OBS.
Goal
RDS Values
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12
S 0.82 (S) 0.25 (W) 0.25 (W) 0.82 (S) 0.59 (N) 0.36 (W) 0.42 (N) 0.55 (N) 0.35 (W) 0.55 (N) 0.25 (W) 0.13 (O)
G1 0.82 (S) 0.25 (W) 0.25 (W) 0.82 (S) 0.59 (N) 0.36 (W) 0.42 (N) 0.55 (N) 0.35 (W) 0.55 (N) 0.25 (W) -
G2 0.82 (S) 0.25 (W) 0.25 (W) 0.82 (S) 0.59 (N) 0.36 (W) 0.42 (N) 0.55 (N) - - - -
G3 - 0.25 (W) 0.25 (W) 0.82 (S) - - - - - - - -
G4 - 0.25 (W) 0.25 (W) 0.82 (S) - - - - - - - -
G5 - - - - 0.59 (N) 0.36 (W) 0.42 (N) 0.55 (N) - - - -
G6 - - - - 0.55 (N) 0.24 (O) 0.35 (W) 0.55 (N) - - - -
G7 - - - - 0.64 (N) 0.6 (N) 0.55 (N) - - - - -
G8 - - - - - - - 0.55 (N) - - - -
G9 - - - - 0.59 (N) 0.36 (W) 0.42 (N) 0.59 (N) - - - -
G10 - - - - - - - - 0.35 (W) 0.55 (N) - -
G11 - - - - - - - - 0.35 (W) - - -
G12 - - - - - - - - - - 0.25 (W) -
G13 - - - - - - - - - - - 0.13 (O)
Defuzzification Our employed RELAX-ation technique[21,28] needs crisp val-
ues to specify the required level of satisfaction for RELAX-ed security require-
ments. Hence, defuzzification is required to map the linguistic priority values of
requirements into their corresponding crisp values. To do so, we use the Center
of Gravity (COG) [32] formula given by (7) and the membership function of the
priority (Figure 4) to deffuzify the priority values. x in this equation denotes
crisp priority values on the x axis of the priority graph in Figure 4. Also µx
denotes the membership function of priorities.
Defuzzified Priority =
∫ 1
0
µx × x× dx∫ 1
0
µx × dx
(7)
Table 6: RELAX-ed Security Requirements of OBS.
Requirement Sample RELAX-ed Value
R1: achieve request transaction code [expiry rate] as close as possible to 0.82×OV1
R2: achieve latency examination [examination delay] as close as possible to 0.25×OV2
R3: achieve one-time pad [randomness] as close as possible to 0.25×OV3
R4: achieve SSL [entropy] as close as possible to 0.82×OV4
R5: achieve password trial limitation [trial delay] as close as possible to 0.59×OV5
R6: achieve password policy [complexity] as close as possible to 0.36×OV6
R7: achieve password encryption [length of encryption key]as many bits as 0.42×OV7
R8: achieve random id [randomness] as close as possible to 0.55×OV8
R9: achieve CAPTCHA [level of distortion] as close as possible to OV9
R10: achieve complex pin [complexity] as close as possible to 0.55×OV10
R11: achieve access control [complexity] as close as possible to 0.25×OV11
R12: achieve redundant server [number of servers] as close as possible to 0.13×OV12
RELAX-ation A requirement is RELAX-ed by relaxing its satisfaction condi-
tion (level). For this purpose we use a RELAX-ation technique proposed in [34].
Fuzzy semantic of the RELAX statements in the technique used properly cap-
tures partiality of security requirements [21]. Equations (8)-(10) demonstrate
this logic.
10
In this equation, the aim is to maximize for each requirement Ri the value
of the membership function µ(Vi− (RDSi×OVi)) which is equivalent to finding
a value Vi for the satisfaction condition of Ri as close as possible to the relaxed
value RDSi × OVi where RDSi denotes the required degree of satisfaction for
Ri and OVi is the optimal value of the satisfaction condition in the absence of
all resource limitations.
Maximize µ
(
Vi − (RDSi ×OVi)
)
, i = 1, ..., n (8)
Subject to µ(xj) ∈ [0, 1], j = 1, ..., n (9)
µ(0) = 1 (10)
For instance consider RELAX-ing from security requirements of the OBS
“R6: achieve password policy” where based on Table 5, SRL[S][R6]= ‘weak.
When a less complex password encryption can be tolerated in SRL[S], satisfac-
tion condition of R6 can be RELAX-ed as : “R6: System shall achieve password
policy [complexity] as close as possible to (RDS6×OV6). The membership func-
tion µ is maximizes (µ(x) = 1) when the variance of the password complexity is
equal to RDS6 ×OV6. In a similar way, security requirements in SRL[S] of the
OBS are RELAX-ed and listed in Table 6. It is important to note that relaxed
attributes are constructed based on the satisfaction metrics of security require-
ments. As depicted in Table 6, satisfaction metrics are placed in the brackets.
For instance, satisfaction metric of R6 is “complexity” of the password policy
while “length” of encryption key is measures satisfaction of R7.
4 Conclusions and Future Work
We presented a scalable framework referred to as the PAPS for goal-based pri-
oritization and selection selection of security requirements which enhances pre-
cision of prioritization and selection by considering partiality of security. The
proposed framework takes the security model of a software as the input and
infers linguistic priorities of security requirements using a fuzzy inference sys-
tem. Satisfaction conditions of security requirements then will be RELAX-ed
when tolerated to partially selected (satisfy) those requirements. The defuzzified
priority of a security requirement specifies its relaxed satisfaction level. Par-
tial selection (satisfaction) of security requirements helps reduce the number of
ignored security requirements which will ultimately reduce the number of unat-
tended security threats. Validity of the PAPS framework was verified through
studying an online banking system which served as our running example.
The work is being continued by developing a tool based on the PAPS frame-
work to assist automated prioritization and partial selection of security require-
ments. Using that tool in real world software project helps evaluate the PAPAS
framework and its impact on the overall security of software in a real settings.
11
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